Although the various manifestations of disordered thought have played a central role in diagnostic and theoretical considerations of schizophrenia, such symptoms have not been found specific to schizophrenia, and at best have shown weak relations to outcome. As part of a 7-year followup study of a sample of young, acute, psychotic inpatients, we explored the hypothesis that despite these poor results there might be particular components of disordered thought that might have prognostic utility and be able to discriminate narrowly defined schizophrenics. Using extant symptom scales as our models, we constructed five internally consistent scales of disordered thought from behavioral ratings made using the Psychotic Inpatient Profile-Poverty of Speech, Attentional Impairment, Incoherence, Delusions, and Hallucinations.
Numerous studies have found that symptoms of disordered thinking are neither diagnostically specific to schizophrenia nor useful in predicting outcome (e.g., Astrup and Noreik 1966; Jansson 1968; Carpenter 1972, 1974; Hawk, Carpenter, and Strauss 1975; Pope and Lipinski 1978; Stephens 1978; Knight et al. 1979; Bland and Orn 1980; Knight and Roff 1985) . Nevertheless, the most frequently used criteria for differentiating schizophrenia from other psychopathologies-for example, DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association 1980), the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer, Endicott, and Robins 1978) and the St. Louis Criteria (Feighner et al. 1972 )-either give substantial weight to various manifestations of disordered thinking or have focused exclusively on such symptoms. The poor diagnostic specificity and prognostic utility of these symptoms do not necessarily mean that disordered thinking is an unimportant construct in schizophrenia. Rather, recent evidence suggests that different kinds of disordered thought may vary in their diagnostic and predictive utility, and thus supports efforts aimed at subdividing this broad class into more homogeneous and potentially valid components. For instance, many of the studies that have failed to find thought symptoms to be effective discriminators or predictors have focused more on disorders of content (delusions and hallucinations) than on well-defined, specific disorders of form (e.g., Hawk, Carpenter, and Strauss 1975; Pope and Lipinski 1978; Bland and Orn 1980) . Further study of the more "formal" aspects of disordered thought is required, despite the Reprint requests should be sent to Dr. R.A. Knight, Dept. of Psychology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254. disagreements about how these should be defined (for examples of diverse criteria, see Spitzer, Endicott, and Robins 1978; Andreasen 1979a; Johnston and Holzman 1979) . Indeed, there is evidence that some of these formal components have more diagnostic specificity than others (e.g., Andreasen 1979b; Holzman, Solovay, and Shenton 1985) .
One aim of the present study is to examine the differential prognostic utility of several components of disordered thinking in a sample of young, acute psychotic psychiatric inpatients, who were part of a 7-year, prospective followup study. A second goal of this study is the exploration of the relation of these components of disordered thought to performance on two cognitive/ perceptual tasks. There is suggestive evidence that some manifest symptoms of disordered thought may be the result of different underlying processes in patients with different disorders. One way to investigate the issue of underlying processes is to relate manifest symptoms to more basic cognitive and perceptual processes. Clearly, if different underlying processes can be identified, they might allow for better diagnostic discrimination and prediction than the manifest symptoms they produce.
Components of Disordered Thought
Recent attempts to partition the range of schizophrenic symptoms into positive and negative symptom clusters or syndromes have focused on the issues of diagnostic specificity, longitudinal stability, and process differentiation. They offer a potential solution to the disordered thought categorization problem. Theoretically, this dichotomy aims at distinguishing losses or diminutions of normal functioning (negative symptoms) from abnormalities or excesses of functioning (positive symptoms). Negative symptoms purportedly are more stable and have more severe prognostic implications than positive symptoms, are supposedly diagnostically more specific to schizophrenia, and hypothetically reflect the operation of distinct pathophysiological processes (Andreasen 1985; Crow 1985) . Although some evidence has accrued supporting the viability of these hypotheses about this dichotomy (e.g., Crow 1985), the problems of both symptom operationahzation and categorization mentioned above plague this research also. Investigators have not reached agreement on the operational definition of individual symptoms (Knight and Roff 1985; Lewine and Sommers 1985; Sommers 1985) , and no consensus has emerged either theoretically (e.g., Andreasen 1985; Crow 1985; Lewine and Sommers 1985; Sommers 1985) or empirically (e.g., Lewine, Fogg, and Meltzer 1983; Bilder et al. 1985; Gibbons et al. 1985) on what symptoms should be considered positive or negative.
The positive-negative symptom classification problem is especially serious in the thought domain. Despite its problems, the dichotomy, because of both the rationale for its attempted discrimination and its preliminary support, provides a reasonable hypothetical structure for our inquiry about the components of disordered thinking. We were limited in our assessment of thought symptoms to the data already gathered at the outset of our study. Nevertheless, we were able to generate from behavioral ratings made during the initial assessment period using the Psychotic Inpatient Profile (PIP) three scales covering domains of disordered thought whose positive-negative statuses have achieved some consensus, and two scales covering domains whose statuses are controversial. In the former category are delusions, hallucinations, and poverty of speech, and in the latter category are incoherence and attentional impairment. These five scales provided an adequate sampling of components of disordered thought for studying the issues of prognosis and cognitive processes.
Most researchers agree that disorders in the content of thought (e.g., delusions and hallucinations) are positive symptoms. The PIP has a sufficient sampling of instances of both delusions and hallucinations to permit the construction of adequate scales assessing each. Poverty of speech is widely accepted as a negative symptom (e.g., Wing 1978; Pogue-Geile and Harrow 1984; Crow 1985) , but there is some evidence that it is also prevalent among depressed patients (Andreasen 1979b; Oltmanns et al. 1985) . We were able to construct a poverty of speech scale from the PIP whose items closely parallel those of Pogue-Geile and Harrow's (1984) scale.
Several items on the PIP allowed us to assess two symptom constructs whose positive-negative statuses are controversial: incoherence/tangentiality and attentional impairment. Lewine, Fogg, and Meltzer (1983) , using a latent-trait model to cluster the symptoms of carefully diagnosed schizophrenics, found that incoherence loaded on their empirically derived negative symptom scale. Gibbons et al. (1985) found further that incoherent speech had a substantial loading on what they interpreted to be a Bleulerian "loss of goal" negative-symptom factor. Other investigators (e.g., Andreasen 1979b; Oltmanns et al. 1985) have found, however, that incoherence did not discriminate schizophrenics from manics, thus raising questions about its negative status.
Attentional impairment is included among negative symptoms only by those (e.g., Andreasen 1982) who equate the negative symptom syndrome with the Bleulerian fundamental symptoms. The preponderance of the data from studies testing schizophrenics' performance on attention-demanding tasks indicates that some kind of an attentional input dysfunction predates the onset of schizophrenia and is a consistent trait of a subsample of schizophrenics in both the acute and remitted stages of the disorder (Knight 1984; Nuechterlein and Dawson 1984) . Such evidence of stability would seem to support its classification as a negative symptom. Two studies that have explored the relation of cognitive performance to symptomatology suggest, however, that a globally defined attentional impairment construct may be tapping aspects of both positive and negative syndromes. Bilder et al. (1985) found that Andreasen's Attentional Impairment scale had high loadings on two symptom factors. Its highest loading was on a factor defined by the "positive" symptoms of thought disorder and bizarre behavior. Of the three factors generated, this factor was the only one to have significant correlations with performance on tests in a neuropsychological battery. Attentional impairment loaded only secondarily on their negative symptom factor. Cornblatt et al. (1985) found that different kinds of problems in attentional performance were associated with different kinds of symptomatology. Measures of distractibility correlated with positive symptoms, but an assessment of resource overload correlated with negative symptoms. These two studies suggest that "attentional dysfunction" may be produced by multiple factors. Our Attentional Impairment scale, which closely approximates Andreasen's (1982) scale, allowed us to explore this further.
Underlying Processes
An important part of the search for distinctly different types of thought disorder is the evaluation of evidence suggesting that the same manifest behavior used to infer disordered thought may be produced by different underlying processes (Strauss, Carpenter, and Bartko 1974) . When the same symptom is manifested in two disorders, it is often concluded that this is due to a shared common process. Thus, when manics and schizophrenics show the same thought symptom, this is frequently attributed to the general psychotic state that they hypothetically share. An alternative explanation, however, must be seriously considered-that cognitive processes unique to each disorder can result in similar symptoms. Such an alternative hypothesis would explain why many thought symptoms lack diagnostic specificity (e.g., Pope and Lipinski 1978; Andreasen 1979b; Oltmanns et al. 1985) , whereas cognitive deficit studies are beginning to isolate cognitive/perceptual processes that appear singularly schizophrenic (cf. Knight 1984; Nuechterlein and Dawson 1984) .
In our 30-year followup study of the child guidance records of preschizophrenics (cf. Knight and Roff 1983) , we found evidence to support this alternative hypothesis. The same Thought Disorder Symptom scale was related to different prior and concurrent symptoms and measures at different times in the course of the disorder. A possible explanation for this cross-temporal change in the pattern of correlations focuses on the constitution of the sample, which was composed of broadly defined DSM-1I (American Psychiatric Association 1968) "schizophrenics," only a portion of whom were "true" process schizophrenics from a longitudinal perspective. The less severely disordered, good prognosis paranoid and affective psychotics in the sample, whose young adult thought disorder symptoms were indistinguishable from their more seriously disordered counterparts, were asymptomatic at middle adulthood. Thus, their thought disorder symptoms influenced the correlations in young adulthood, but only the persisting symptoms of the process cases determined the pattern of the middle adult correlations. It seems reasonable to conclude from the differences both in childhood antecedents and in the course of the disorders to middle adulthood that the good prognosis, paranoid/ affective psychotics, whose thought disorder symptoms abated, differed in underlying pathology from the process cases. Such a conclusion also suggests that the thought disorder symptoms in each group, although indistinguishable in young adulthood, might be the result of different underlying processes.
It could be argued that our Thought Disorder Symptom scale, which comprised hallucinations, delusions, bizarre or psychotic thinking, and confusion, was too general and that the support for multiple underlying processes rests on weak inferences. Moreover, although these results are not consistent with the shared psychotic state hypothesis, they do not disconfirm it. In the present followup study, we were able to test more directly the hypothesis that the changes in the pattern of correlations from young to middle adulthood were due to the abatement of good prognosis cases' symptoms and the relative persistence of process cases' symptoms through the followup period. To accomplish this goal in the present study, we used diagnosis at outcome to partition the sample into subgroups that differ in outcome symptomatology. For the entire sample and for these various diagnostic subgroups, we calculated correlations between the behaviorally assessed components of disordered thought that we derived from the PIP and performance on our two perceptual/cognitive tasks-choice reaction time and Shipley-Hartford Abstraction. We hypothesized that to the degree that the different performance measures tapped differences in underlying processes among particular patient groups, there should be changes in the patterns of correlations across outcome diagnostic specifications. These pattern changes should be most pronounced for Attentional Impairment, because there is independent evidence (Bilder et al. 1985; Cornblatt et al. 1985 ) that multiple causative factors may contribute to the behaviors used to infer attentional deficiencies. It would be difficult to attribute any correlational pattern differences among diagnostic groups to changes in psychotic state, because all groups shared this state when they were assessed on the components of disordered thought and the cognitive/ perceptual tasks.
The questions addressed in the present study can be summarized as follows: (1) Are there discnminable components of disordered thought that vary in their prognostic utility? How do they relate to each other and to other selected concurrent measures7 (2) Does the pattern of prognosis and relation to outcome diagnosis coincide with the current hypotheses about positive and negative symptoms7 (3) Is there evidence, especially from the Attentional Impairment scale, that different underlying cognitive processes may produce similar manifest difficulties in patients with different disorders?
Methods
Design. The 75 subjects in this study were sampled from a larger group of psychiatric inpatients who were part of a 7-year followup study (cf. Knight and Roff 1985) . This sample consisted of all those patients who during the followup period were either diagnosed schizophrenic by ward psychiatrists or met the criteria for schizophrenia in any one of the five diagnostic systems we applied: RDC, St. Louis criteria, New Haven Schizophrenia Index (NHSI) (Astrachan et al. 1972) , Taylor-Abrams criteria (Taylor, Abrams, and Gaztanaga 1975) , or the World Health Organization Flexible 6 (WHO-6) (Carpenter, Strauss, and Bartko 1973) . These five diagnoses were made by two independent raters from our extensive followup records (cf. Marvinney, Rosenberg, and Knight 1982) .
A number of behavioral, performance-based, self-report, interview, and medical-file-derived measures (described below) were gathered during the initial hospitalization between January 1970, and June 1971. Followup data were collected during 1978-79 by a thorough search of VA medical and claim files. Additional record sources were investigated, when hospitaluations outside of the VA system were indicated.
As the outcome diagnostic criteria used to partition our sample for the subgroup correlational analyses designed to explore our underlying processes hypothesis, we chose RDC for pragmatic reasons. The TaylorAbrams criteria were too unreliable; and the NHSI and WHO-6 were too inclusive and exclusive, respectively, and thus did not yield sufficiently large subgroups for the correlational analyses we planned. The St. Louis criteria were eliminated because only a small number of schizophrenics rated definite by these criteria had been rated on the PIP. For the entire sample and for each of the RDC subgroups, we examined the concurrent and predictive validity of scales of disordered thought, rationally derived from the PIP. We correlated these scales with other selected, prospective measures and with measures of several domains assessed at outcome. We will discuss the procedures for each of these prospective and outcome domains in turn.
Subjects. We focused on the diagnostic distinctions made by the RDC for making comparisons within our sample. Patients classed as nonschizophrenic by our use of RDC met either the RDC for major affective or schizoaffective disorder or the DSM-III criteria for paranoid disorder. Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of the entire sample and separately for the RDC groups of nonschizophrenic, probable schizophrenic, and definite schizophrenic patients. The three RDC groups did not differ in age, Shipley-Hartford Vocabulary and Abstract scores, average Phillips (1953) ratings, or total number of months hospitalized before the initial assessment (all F's < 1). The groups did differ, however, in their number of hospitalizations before the initial assessment (F = 3.82; df «= 2, 58; p < .05). The RDC probable schizophrenics had had fewer hospitalizations than both of the other groups {p < .05 by Newman-Keuls).
Prospective Measures
Psychotic Inpatient Profile. The Psychotic Inpatient Profile (PIP) is an inventory designed to quantify observable verbal and nonverbal behavior of psychiatric inpatients. It was developed from factor-analytic studies of extensive ward observations (Lorr and Vestre 1968, 1969) . Of the 96 items, 74 describe behaviors that are rated as occurring "not at all," "occasionally," "fairly often," or "nearly always." Specific verbal statements, such as "says people or machines make him do or say things" (item 75), are assessed by 17 dichotomous, true-false items. Finally, five true-false items assess orientation.
Procedure. The PIP was filled out by a group of experienced nurses or psychiatric aides, chosen by the head nurse as competent, conscientious individuals who had ample opportunity to observe and talk to the patient. Many had previous experience with the PIP because a study that used it (Watson and Klett 1972) had just been completed when the ratings for the present study were initiated. The raters were given a list of PIP items, and asked to observe and talk to their assigned patient for 3 days. The standard rating forms were given to the raters after the observation period was completed. We familiarized the raters with the rating procedures and attempted to impress on them the importance of making accurate and independent judgments. We asked them not to fill out the form unless they had observed and interacted adequately with the patient. Pairs of raters observed individual patients during the same 3-day period, and ratings for each patient were completed within 2 weeks of admission.
Scale construction. We employed a combined rational/empirical approach to scale construction using the 96 PIP items. Our goal was to maximize internal consistency and to sample as many thought disorder domains as the content of the PIP permitted. For each of the five thought disorder categories that we judged could be adequately assessed-attentional impairment, 'sz = schizophrenics. 'n Is shown in parentheses.
•RDC probable schizophrenics had (ewer hospltallzatlons than the other two RDC groups.
poverty of speech, incoherence, delusions, and hallucinations-we created scales by averaging the independent ratings of each item and adding these averaged scores. We also calculated Cronbach's a to determine the internal consistency of these scales. Because interrater reliabilities of the revised scales were lower than desired, we calculated the individual item reliabilities for each scale to determine whether the deletion of specific unreliable items in each item group could enhance interrater reliability without loss of internal consistency. This was possible for two scales (Delusions and Hallucinations). Because the enhancement of reliability resulting from the deletion of several items in the delusion and hallucination item groups limited the sampling of these positive symptom domains, we created an additional composite item group, called Delusions/Hallucinations, which comprised all possible relevant behaviors addressed by PIP items. This item group had reasonable internal consistency, but somewhat lower interrater reliability than either of its subcomponent scales.
The final scales and their component items are presented in table 2, along with their internal consistencies and the estimated interrater reliabilities of the averaged scores of the two raters (cf. Roff 1981). The internal consistencies of these scales, though moderate, indicate sufficient cohesion to warrant further analyses. The interrater reliabilities were adequate for Poverty of Speech, borderline for Delusions, Hallucinations, and the combined scale Delusions/Hallucinations, and low for Attentional Impairment and Incoherence. The low reliabilities for the last two variables indicate that any failure to find significant concurrent and predictive correlations with these variables must be interpreted cautiously.
A perusal of the content of these scales indicates close similarity to scales developed by other inves- .60 VOL. 12, NO. 3, 1986 433 tigators. The Attentional Impairment scale approximates the "interview inattentiveness" and the "complaints of inattentiveness" items that define Andreasen's (1982) Attentional Impairment scale. The Poverty of Speech scale closely parallels PogueGeile and Harrow's (1984) version of this scale. The Incoherence scale was so labeled because it is most heavily weighted with "incomprehensibility" items (cf. Andreasen 1979a). Because our scale lacks specificity about where in discourse incomprehensibility is produced (i.e., within or across sentences), it does not clearly differentiate incoherence from derailment and tangentiality as Andreasen's (1979a) scale does. Since incoherence, derailment, and tangentiality have all been found to be highly related (Andreasen 1979b) , it seems reasonable to assume that this PIP Incoherence scale captures the common core of these three scales. The Delusions scale focuses on delusions of grandiosity. The Hallucinations scale measures .auditory hallucinations.
Reaction Time Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli for the reaction time task consisted of 11 Munsell color chips, necessitating that one of the initial subject selection criteria be the absence of color blindness. The standard color was a middle yellow (5 Y). The comparative colors were five "redder" (2.5 Y, 10 YR, 7.5 YR, 5 YR, and 2.5 YR) and five "greener" (7.5 Y, 10 Y, 2.5 GY, 5 GY, and 7.5 GY) colors that varied from the standard in just noticeable difference units (1-5 in each direction). All stimuli were presented with an Iconix 6135 tachistoscope. For each trial, the experimenter first indicated verbally that the stimulus for that trial was ready. The subject then depressed a foot pedal. After a 500 ms delay, the standard was presented for 1 second, followed immediately by 1 of the 10 comparative stimuli. This stimulus remained on until the subject depressed one of two response keys to indicate whether the stimulus was "redder" or "greener" than the standard color, or until 3 seconds had elapsed. Reaction time was measured as the duration from the onset of the comparative stimulus until one key was depressed. The 10 comparative colors were randomized in blocks of 10 for a total of 60 blocks, and 10 trials were given within each block. On 3 days within a span no longer than 10 days, each subject was given 200 trials per day. Three reaction time performance variables were calculated for each subject: overall mean reaction time, the mean of the variance within each block of 10 trials, and the mean number of incorrect responses within each block.
Medical-File Ratings. Using medical file abstracts created during the 1970-71 hospitalization, which included social histories, mental status exams, psychological testing, and summaries of the patients' ward behavior taken from nurses' ward notes, two clinical psychologists (R.K. and J.R.) independently made global judgments of the severity of disordered thought on a 5-point scale: not present (1) through severe, obvious, and persistent (5). These clinicians also rated the severity of affective deficit on a 5-category scale: normal or depressed/anxious (1); hostile, irritable, or affectively unstable (manic-depressive) (3); flat or inappropriate, and withdrawn (5). The average of the two clinicians' thought disorder judgments and their consensus judgment of affective deficit were used in all analyses. The estimated interrater reliability (Roff 1981 ) of the average rating of disordered thought was high (r «= .86, df = 59, p < .001), but the estimated reliability of the consensus affectivity judgment was low (r = .46, df -60, p < .001), because of the difficulty differentiating flat affect from depression (cf. Knight and Roff 1985) .
Intelligence and Social Competence. Because both intellectual impairment and poor social competence have often been found characteristic of schizophrenics with negative symptoms (e.g., Crow 1980; Andreasen and Olsen 1982; Farmer, McGuffin, and Spitznagel 1983; Knight and Roff 1983; Levin et al. 1985) , we included assessments of both among our concurrent measures. Our intelligence measure, the Shipley-Hartford Abstraction Test, was administered according to standard procedure (Shipley 1940) . In a previous study (Knight, Epstein, and Zielony 1980) , poor performance on this test correlated with both our medical-file judgment of disordered thought and high scores on the Whitaker Index of Schizophrenic Thinking. Premorbid social competence was assessed by the Phillips (1953) scale. All patients were rated on Farina's (Farina et al. 1962; Farina, Garmezy, and Barry 1963) adaptation of this scale on the basis of the subjects' responses both to DeWolfe's (1968) General Information Questionnaire and to our social competence interview. The interrater reliability of the scale was high (r -.97, df = 59, p < .001).
Outcome Measures
Followup Procedures. After a period of 7 years, we were able to obtain followup data for all 75 of the patients in the present sample from VA medical and claim files, and State hospital and criminal records.
Six research assistants were trained to make ratings on the extensive clinical file data that were gathered. They had access to and rated only information about the patients between 1972 and 1978.
The assistants were divided into two groups. The two assistants who had had the most extensive experience with clinical files were trained to make diagnostic and symptoms judgments and to rate global outcome. For each patient, they made independent diagnostic ratings of schizophrenia, affective disorder, and nonpsychotic using the five diagnostic criteria listed in the Design section. These two assistants also independently rated all subjects on the Symptom-Sign Inventory (SSI) (Gordon and Gregson 1970), on the same thought disorder and affect deficit judgments used by the clinicians in the prospective ratings, and on a 7-point Global Outcome scale. This outcome scale was a slight modification of a 6-point scale whose development and use we have described elsewhere (Knight et al. 1979; Roff, Knight, and Wertheim 1976) . It ranges from Outcome 1, recovered, to Outcome 7, definite process schizophrenic, deteriorated or unimproved.
After completing their independent ratings, the two assistants resolved discrepancies with a consensus procedure. The reliabilities of their independent ratings are presented in table 3. Their consensus ratings were used in all subsequent analyses.
The other four assistants were trained to make social competence and work history judgments and to compile data on hospitalizations. A consensus procedure, like that of the diagnostic raters, was used for the social competence scales. It involved a comparison of two independent ratings and discussion of discrepant ratings to reach a mutually agreeable judgment. Items about which no agreement could be attained were coded as missing. The hospitalization and work ratings were made by two assistants. One assistant compared the two ratings, checked for errors, and rechecked the clinical file when discrepancies were found. Table 3 presents the rating scales and the estimated interrater reliabilities of the consensus ratings where appropriate.
Outcome Thought Disorder Scale Construction. Although there were no outcome scales that directly assessed positive and negative thought disorder symptoms, the diagnostic checklists and symptom rating sheets of the two diagnostic raters contained adequate information to allow the post hoc creation of several outcome thought disorder scales. We sorted selected thought disorder symptoms into three rational item groups: formal thought disorder, delusions of any type, and hallucinations of any type. The Formal Thought Disorder scale was composed of instances of formal thought disorder and thought symptoms that some investigators have considered to be negative symptoms. The latter two categories were considered to represent positive symptoms of disordered thought content. For each individual rater and for the consensus ratings, scale scores were obtained for each patient by summing the values (symptom present = 1; absent =• 0) of each symptom on a scale and dividing this value by the number of valid, nonmissing items. Cronbach's a calculated on the consensus ratings of the two assistants and the interrater reliability calculated on the independent scale scores for each rater appear in table 4, along with the final list of thought disorder symptoms on each scale.
Results
Correlations Among the PIP Scales. the Poverty of Speech scale, all the correlations among these scales were highly significant. Poverty of Speech did not correlate with either Attentional Impairment or with Delusions, and its correlations with Incoherence, Hallucinations, and Delusions/ Hallucinations were the lowest of the significant correlations. This general pattern of correlations remained constant even when subgroups selected by the more stringent RDC inclusionary criteria for probable and definite schizophrenia were analyzed. The only difference in these analyses was that the correlations between Poverty of Speech and other PIP scales were lower in the more restricted subgroups. The correlations of these scales among patients considered not schizophrenic by RDC also paralleled those in the entire sample. In sum, the pattern of all sets of correlations was similar to that shown in table 5.
Delusions and Hallucinations (r = .57, df = 52\ p < .001) and Attentional Impairment and Incoherence (r = .64, df = 52, p < .001) were the two most highly correlated symptom pairs. Incoherence was highly related to the Delusions and Hallucinations scale pair (mean r = .52), and Attentional Impairment was moderately correlated with this pair (mean r = 41). For the entire sample Poverty of Speech was not ' Differences in the degrees of freedom (n-2) reflect different amounts of missing data In all the analyses described, we used all the data available on these subjects. We were not able to gather the entire battery of measures on all sub]ects For example, 55 patients were rated on the PIP, 51 were given the reaction time task, and 62 received medical-file judgments of their affeclivity and thought disorder Of the 55 patients rated on the PIP, 42 had been given the reaction time task, and 48 had received affectivity and thought disorder ]udgments. The most important pattern of results is the changing relation between the Attentional Impairment scale and the cognitive/perceptual tasks across the RDC subgroups. For 1 A principal component analysis (PCA) of the five PIP scales on the entire sample yielded a single factor on which Poverty of Speech had a low factor loading and the remaining four PIP scales had high loadings When other variables that did not measure thought disorder (e g , Phillips premorbid social competence, affectivity) were introduced inlo the correlation matrix, and the PCA was repeated with vanmax rotation, Poverty of Speech did not load on the factor on which the other four PIP scales continued to load, and it had a high factor loading on another factor that was orthogonal lo the PIP Disordered Thought factor the entire sample and for the nonschizophrenics, neither the Shipley Abstraction score nor the three reaction time measures were related to any of the PIP scales. For the probable and definite schizophrenics, only the Attentional Impairment scale consistently correlated with these measures, r = -.39, df = 23, p < .07, r = .50 and .45, df = 18, p < .05, and r = .63, df = 18, p < .01, respectively, for the Shipley, mean reaction time, number incorrect, and variance reaction time for the combined probable and definite schizophrenics, and r = -.74, df = 13, p < .01, r = .73, df = 12, p < .01, and r = .76, df = 12, p < .001, for the Shipley and mean and variance reaction times for the definite schizophrenics only. Thus, as predicted, Attentional Impairment's relation to measures of cognitive performance varied with outcome diagnosis.
The second notable pattern in table 6 is the weak or nonexistent relation of each of the PIP scales in each of the RDC groups both to the Phillips premorbidity scale, a frequent correlate of the negative-positive symptom distinction (e g., Farmer, McGuffin, and Spitznagel 1983) , and to the affective deficit medical-file judgment, a commonly agreed upon negative symptom (Lewine and Sommers 1985) and a rather substantial predictor of poor outcome (cf. Knight and Roff 1985) . The Attentional Impairment and Poverty of Speech scales correlated with poor premorbidity in the full sample, r •= .31 and .35, df = 48, p < .025, respectively; and both showed a very weak relation to poor premorbidity among the nonschizophrenics, r = .37 and .36, df = 22, p < .10, respectively. Neither, however, was related to the Phillips scale in the probable or definite schizophrenic subdivisions. The only scale even remotely related to the affective deficit judgment was the Attentional Impairment scale, r = .27, df = 46, p < .07, and r = .48, df = 12, p < 09, for the entire sample and for the definite schizophrenics, respectively. There appears, therefore, only weak, inconsistent support for the notion that the purportedly negative symptoms of affective deficit, social incompetence, and poverty of speech covary sufficiently to form a cohesive cluster.
Predictive Validity of the PIP Scales.
The correlations of the PIP scales with various outcome measures are presented in table 7. Three major results are evident in this table. First and most important, Attentional Impairment was clearly the most consistent predictor among the PIP scales of poor outcome. No matter how the sample was divided, higher Attentional Impairment scores significantly predicted a greater incidence and amount of hospitahzation between 1972 and 1978, r = .36 and .34 , df = 53, p < .01, respectively, for the entire sample; r = .58 and .46, df = 25, p < .01 and .05, respectively, for the combined probable and definite schizophrenics, r = 60 and .57, df = 16, p < 01, respectively, for the definite schizophrenics, and r = .45 and .52, df = 24, p < 05 and .01, respectively, for the nonschizophrenics. It was also weakly related to poorer Global Outcome for the entire sample, r = .25, df = 51, p < .08, and significantly predicted poorer Global Outcome for each of the subdivisions, r = .39, df = 25, p < .05 for the probable and definite schizophrenics; r = 47, df = 16, p < 05 for the definite schizophrenics alone: and r = .52, df = 23, p < 01 for the nonschizophrenics Moreover, it tended to forecast problems in establishing deep social relationships during the followup period; r = .37, df = 50, p < 01 for the entire sample; r = .36, df = 25, p < .07 for the probable and definite schizophrenics, r = .50, df = 16, p < .05 for the definite schizophrenics alone; and r = .35, df = 21, p < .10 for the nonschizophrenics. Finally, among the schizophrenic subdivisions, it was prognostic of lack of employment stability; r = .46, df = 23, p < .05 for the probable and definite schizophrenics; and r = .48, df = 15, p < .05 for the definite schizophrenics.
The second finding is the relative lack of prognostic utility of Poverty of Speech and Incoherence, both of which have been classified by some researchers as negative symptoms (e.g., Lewine, Fogg, and Meltzer 1983; Pogue-Geile and Harrow 1984) . Consistent with its concurrent associations, Poverty of Speech did predict one measure of social competence, social contacts, for the entire sample, r = .30, df = 49, p < 05, and it was related to the outcome affect deficit judgment for the entire sample, r = .31, df = 51, p < .05, but no clear pattern of relationships to outcome measures emerged The Incoherence scale only predicted the outcome thought disorder medicalfile judgment and Global Outcome for the nonschizophrenics, r = .51, df = 24, and r = .48, df = 23, p < .01.
The third major finding is that among those diagnosed probable or definite schizophrenic, the Outcome Hallucinations scale was the only outcome disordered thought scale that was related to any earlier disordered thought measures. It was predicted by the PIP Hallucinations and Attentional Impairment scales, for the combined RDC probable and definite schizophrenics, r = .40 and .56, df = 24, p < .05 and .01, respectively, and for the definite schizophrenics only, r = .48 and .69, df -15, p < .05 and .01, respectively. The outcome Formal Thought Disorder and Delusion scales were related to several earlier PIP scales, but only for the nonschizophrenics. Within this group, the Attentional Impairment scale, r = .40, df = 24, p < .05, and the Delusion scale, r = 41, df = 24, p < .05, predicted more outcome Formal Thought Disorder, and less Poverty of Speech foreshadowed more outcome Delusions, r =• = -.40, df = 24, p < .05. Thus, the stability of our measures of disordered thought was not great. Of note is the finding that Attentional Impairment did predict outcome disordered thought in addition to its relation to the concurrent thought measures.
Relation to RDC Outcome Diagnosis.
To determine the relation of scores on the PIP thought disorder scales (the Delusions/Hallucinations scale was excluded because of overlap with its two component scales) to subsequent status on the RDC, we calculated two separate stepwise discriminant function analyses using Wilk's A (Cooley and Lohnes 1971) In the first, we attempted to discriminate with these five scales the patients included as definite schizophrenics by the RDC from those considered not schizophrenic by these criteria. In the second, we attempted to discriminate the combined RDC definite and probable schizophrenics from the nonschizophrenics. In both analyses, the results were the same-only the Attentional Impairment scale was selected from among the five scales. It alone significantly discriminated the definite schizophrenics from the nonschizophrenics (A = .89, F = 5.34, df = 1/42, p < .05), and the combined probable and definite schizophrenics from the nonschizophrenics (A = .86, F = 8.19, df = 1/50, p < .01). Surprisingly, however, in both analyses the nonschizophrenics' scores on the Attentional Impairment scale were significantly higher than in the comparison groups. This paradoxical finding seems even stranger, when compared with the results for these same RDC subgroups of the analysis of another measure of attention, reaction time performance. Table 8 presents the mean reaction time, the mean reaction time variance, and the mean number of incorrect responses per block of trials for the entire sample and for each subgroup separately. One-way analyses of variance comparing the three diagnostic subgroups revealed no group differences on any of these variables, although the mean reaction time differences did approach significance, F = 2.97, df =• 2/46, p = .06 A subsequent two-group analysis of variance revealed that the definite schizophrenics had higher reaction times than the probable and nonschizophrenics, F = 5.83, df = 1/47, p < .025.
Discussion
In the analyses of our followup data, we addressed questions about the prognostic utility of components of disordered thought, about the viability of the positive-negative syndrome symptom classification systems, and about the cognitive processes underlying disordered thought symptoms.
Specificity and Prognosis of Thought
Components. We found that various components of disordered thinking could be distinguished by the pattern of their interrelations, their correlations with concurrent variables, and their differential predictive power The correlations among the five PIP scales (excluding the hybrid Delusions/Hallucinations scale, whose results differed little from its constituent parts) suggested that Poverty of Speech was distinct from the other four scales. It had low or nonsignificant correlations with the other scales, which all correlated moderately or highly with each other. Among the remaining four scales, Attentional Impairment and Incoherence, and Delusions and Hallucinations were the most highly correlated scale pairs, but did not form clear subclusters, because all scales were significantly correlated.
The five scales showed distinctly different patterns of correlations with other prospective measures and with the various outcome criteria. Consistent with Pogue-Geile and Harrow's (1984 Harrow's ( , 1985 findings, our Poverty of Speech scale correlated with premorbid social competence. The predictive power of this scale was limited to social and affective competence within the entire psychotic sample, except for two significant correlations with the outcome thought disorder medicalfile record judgment and the Formal Thought Disorder outcome scale among the definite schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics, respectively. Thus, it seems likely that the behaviors included in this scale were Note. -RDC = Research Diagnostic Criteria, sz = schizophrenic, n's are shown in parentheses 'RDC definite schizophrenics had significantly longer reaction times than the combined probable schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics tapping more social than cognitive competence, and its status as a disordered thought symptom might be questioned. Although the Attentional Impairment and the Incoherence scales were highly correlated with each other, both the pattern of their concurrent correlations and their predictive power were radically different. Incoherence was only related to the thought disorder judgment at initial assessment for the entire sample and for the nonschizophrenics. It failed as a predictor, showing only minor sporadic relations to outcome for the nonschizophrenics and no ability to discriminate outcome diagnosis. Because of its poor interrater reliability, final evaluation of the status of this symptom must, however, await further evidence. In contrast, the Attentional Impairment scale was the only thought disorder scale to have a strong relation to poor outcome. It predicted hospitalization, social competence, work steadiness, and global outcome for both schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics, suggesting that it is assessing a persistent, nonspecific, core deficit. Contrary to the expectation that the behaviors assessed on the Attentional Impairment scale would be more characteristic of narrowly defined schizophrenics, they were found to a greater degree in RDC nonschizophrenics than in definite schizophrenics.
It is noteworthy that the Attentional Impairment scale showed its predictive power in spite of its low interrater reliability. It had the lowest interrater reliability of the six PIP scales assessed. The consistency and pervasiveness of its predictions argue against attributing these results to chance. It is possible that among the multiple raters there were several less sensitive raters whose ratings lowered the overall reliability, yet did not destroy the scale's ability to tap a predictive, reasonably cohesive domain. Despite the very low interrater reliability, the internal consistency of the scale was still moderate, suggesting that it is also unlikely that the scale served simply as a broadband catchment for psychopathology and was predictive simply because of its wider sampling of pathological behaviors (Ghiselli, Campbell, and Zedeck 1981) . It seems more probable that the scale is globally tapping behavioral problems in attending and that a more precise defining of items and training of raters (cf. Knight and Blaney 1977) might yield better prediction. Both these results and our previously reported affective deficit results (Knight and Roff 1985) are cogent reminders that reliability and discriminatory power are not necessarily linked (cf. Nicewander and Price 1983) and that theoretically important measures should not be discarded simply because they are difficult to assess reliably.
The remaining three scales were composed exclusively of measures of thought content. The Delusions scale was consistently related to the concurrent thought disorder medicalfile judgment across the various divisions of the sample, was correlated with larger variance of reaction times for the RDC definite schizophrenics, but was unrelated to any outcome measures except for the Outcome Hallucinations scale for the entire sample. The PIP Hallucinations scale was related to the concurrent thought disorder medicalfile judgment for the entire sample and for the nonschizophrenics, but not for the schizophrenics. The only outcome measures it predicted were Hallucinations for the schizophrenics and better affectivity for the combined RDC probable and definite schizophrenics. The sixth scale, the combined Delusions/Hallucinations scale, which had a wider sampling of thought content, was not a better predictor than its constituents. Thus, all of the scales of thought content showed weak predictive validity.
In sum, only one of the PIP disordered thinking scales, Attentional Impairment, predicted general aspects of adaptation 7 years later. Paradoxically, however, it was found to be less prevalent in patients diagnosed as definite schizophrenics by RDC at outcome than in psychotic patients diagnosed nonschizophrenic by these same criteria. Two other scales showed evidence of only domain-specific prediction. Poverty of Speech predicted social and affective competence for the entire sample, and the Hallucinations scale was related to outcome hallucinations, but only among the schizophrenics. Finally, neither Delusions nor Incoherence predicted either outcome adaptation or diagnosis.
Positive and Negative Syndromes. The pattern of results provides only weak support for the hypothesis that the symptom clusters Delusions/ Hallucinations and Poverty of Speech/Affective Deficit tap separate, cohesive syndromes with distinguishable predictive and discriminatory power. First, there was some evidence that the two hypothesized syndrome clusters were separable. Consistent with the majority of previous analyses of the relation between positive and negative symptoms, Poverty of Speech/Affective Deficit and Delusions/Hallucinations did not correlate with each other (Johnstone et al. 1981; Lewine, Fogg, and Meltzer 1983; Harrow 1984, 1985; Rosen et al. 1984 ; but not Andreasen and Olsen 1982) . Second, although the positive symptoms that we assessed were cohesive, the two negative symptoms were not. Delusions and Hallucinations were highly correlated, suggesting that these scales might be tapping the same positive syndrome. In contrast, Poverty of Speech was only correlated with the outcome Affective Deficit judgment and not with the concurrent judgment, indicating weak cohesion between these supposedly negative symptoms. Third, consistent with the expectations for positive symptoms, Delusions and Hallucinations showed little predictive validity and no ability to discriminate RDC definite schizophrenics. Poverty of Speech, however, unlike the Affective Deficit judgment (cf. Knight and Roff 1985) , did not show the predictive power expected of a negative symptom. It was only weakly related to specific domains of outcome and did not discriminate narrowly defined schizophrenics. In sum, the positive symptoms results were in accord with the expectations of the syndrome model, but for the negative symptoms only Affective Deficit results and not Poverty of Speech results supported the model. Thus, Poverty of Speech, at least as measured in this study, does not appear to tap a negative syndrome.
Because of poor interrater reliability of our Incoherence scale and the lack of items on the PIP to allow us to differentiate it adequately from tangentiahty and derailment, its failure to discriminate diagnostic groups and to predict outcome cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that it should be excluded from the negative symptom syndrome These failures should not, however, be completely discounted. Attentional Impairment had similar problems with interrater reliability and definitional specificity, yet predicted better than any measure of disordered thought, including our highly reliable medical-file Thought Disorder judgment (cf. Knight and Roff 1985) .
The predictive power of the Attentional Impairment scale supports the categorization of attention as a negative symptom. The fact that the attentional behaviors assessed by our scale were more characteristic of outcome RDC nonschizophrenics than of RDC definite schizophrenics, however, contradicts this conclusion. This paradoxical combination of pervasive predictive power for all subgroups assessed and diagnostic discrimination opposite to that which would be predicted suggests that the behavioral manifestations of attentional problems in these different diagnostic subgroups might result from different underlying cognitive processes, each of which has prognostic utility. Such a hypothesis is supported by other studies (e.g., Bilder et al. 1985; Cornblatt et al. 1985) that have yielded evidence suggesting the complexity of global behavioral attention measures. Our analysis of the concurrent correlations of our Attentional Impairment scale, described below, also corroborates this conclusion. If this speculation is correct, we may not be able to solve the problem of partitioning such overt thought symptoms until we have a better understanding of the cognitive processes that produce them. It may well be that when such processes are better understood, the positivenegative distinction will be shown to be an oversimplified dichotomy, as others have suggested (Bilder et al 1985; Gibbons et al. 1985 ).
Underlying Cognitive Processes. As a way of exploring the possibility that different underlying cognitive processes might be responsible for similar disordered thinking behaviors in different pathologies, we examined the pattern of correlations between the five components of disordered thinking and the two cognitive measures across subgroups defined by outcome diagnosis. This analytic strategy, as we explained in the introduction, was generated to test our interpretation of the results of another followup study (Knight and Roff 1983) . Because performance on choice reaction time, one of our cognitive measures, is vulnerable to attentional problems, and because other studies have found evidence suggesting that the behaviors used to infer attentional problems may be multiply determined, we hypothesized that we were most likely to find evidence for different underlying processes for the behaviors assessed by our Attentional Impairment scale. Our speculation was correct. The lack of relation between the reaction time measures and the Attentional Impairment scale for the entire sample and for the RDC nonschizophrenics, and the high correlation between these measures for the definite schizophrenics (cf. table 6) suggests that the manifest behaviors captured by the Attentional Impairment scale might be produced by different processes for the nonschizophrenics and probable schizophrenics than for the definite schizophrenics.
Paradoxically, behavioral attention problems were more prevalent among the RDC nonschizophrenics than among the probable or definite schizophrenics. Because there was no correlation between Attentional Impairment and the cognitive measures for these patients, and because their reaction times were faster than those of the definite schizophrenics, we have no basis in our data for speculation about the nature of the deficit producing their behavioral attention problems. Whatever the deficit, our results suggest that it is related to poorer outcome among these patients. As indicated in the Methods section, this group was composed almost completely of affective, schizoaffective, and paranoid cases. Because the Attentional Impairment scale predicted poorer long-term outcome among these patients, it is unlikely that their attentional problems were due to transient acute affective or paranoid states. It is important when thinking about the seeming paradox of finding the supposedly better prognosis nonschizophrenics to have a greater amount of a debilitating deficit to remember that RDC criteria for schizophrenia focus less on chronicity and poor outcome than do other diagnostic criteria (Marvinney, Rosenberg, and Knight 1982) . Indeed, these criteria selected as definite schizophrenics patients who did not differ from the excluded patients in their Phillips premorbid adjustment scores.
The high correlation between Attentional Impairment and choice reaction time for definite schizophrenics and the predictive power of both of these measures (cf., also, Elliott and Knight 1982) suggests that for a subset of these definite schizophrenics, some deficiency involving attentional processes constitutes a core deficit. The nature of this deficit is far from certain. The specification of an underlying process requires more than performance on any single laboratory task (cf. Knight 1984) . Moreover, choice reaction time performance involves too many processing levels to yield specific implications (e.g., Smith 1980). Thus, the covariation of reaction time performance and the Attentional Impairment scale among the definite schizophrenics does not lead us to believe that we have explained the deficit producing attentional difficulties in a subset of RDC definite schizophrenics. Indeed, these data raise more questions than they answer. For instance, it has been found in the cognitive research on schizophrenics that an early encoding deficit covaries with premorbidity (Saccuzzo and Braff 1981; Knight, Elliott, and Freedman 1985) . In the present study, neither reaction time performance nor scores on the Attentional Impairment scale covaried with premorbidity. This pattern suggests the possibility that the reaction time deficiency might be the result of a different underlying cognitive deficit, and that it is this deficit and not the early encoding deficit that is responsible for the kinds of behavioral problems assessed by the Attentional Impairment scale. The independence of reaction time level and early encoding deficiencies is consistent with the results of recent cognitive studies in our laboratory . Clearly, more research is needed to resolve this and other process-oriented questions. Moreover, the results of the present study must be replicated, especially because of the paradoxical and unexpected nature of certain findings.
Finally, these data highlight the complexity of the task of specifying the cognitive processes responsible for the disordered thought behaviors encountered in schizophrenia. In attempts at integrating laboratory tasks that supposedly assess specific processes with scales of more manifest and naturalistic disordered thought behaviors, it is not sufficient to correlate the two (Neale, Oltmanns, and Harvey 1985) . Rather, more complex approaches must be undertaken, such as the application to psychiatric populations of the strategies proposed for the cognitive assessment of individual differences (Sternberg 1981) . In addition to the preliminary groundwork of examining the relation of various processing tasks to symptom manifestations within specific patient groups (the cognitive correlates approach), we must also ultimately create and test cognitive process models of symptom manifestation (cf. Knight 1984 , for an example of a primitive model). This latter approach, which is similar to Steinberg's cognitive components strategy, enhances the opportunity for disconfirmation and thus maximizes the potential for advancing our knowledge (Popper 1972) . The data from the present study suggest that in attempting these strategies, we need to be guided not only by specific models of cognition, but also by better typological models of psychoses and schizophrenia.
